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RECENT CASE NOTES
BILLS AND NOTES-ALTERATION OF CHECK FACIITATED BY SPACE LFT, IN
DRAWING--LABIL1TY OF BANK To DRAWE.-The plaintiff signed a check handed
to him by his clerk who kept the petty cash and who stated that two pounds was
wanted for petty cash. The body of the check was in the handwriting of the
clerk. The line intended for inserting words indicating the amount was
entirely blank, but there were the figures 2. 0.0. in the line intended for figures.
There were spaces before and after the figure "2" sufficiently large so that
additional figures could be inserted. The clerk, after obtaining the plaintiff's
signature, wrote in theblank line the words "one hundred and twenty pounds"
and added the figures "I" and "o" on either side of the figure "2
'. He then
cashed the check and absconded. Held, that the drawer could recover from the
bank the amount paid, less fwo pounds. Macmillan v. London Joint Stock Bank
(C. A.) [1917] 2 K. B. 439. See COMMENTS, p. 242.
BILLS AND Nos--GRATUrTOus ASSIGNMENT BY SEPARATE INSTRUMENT.- the
payee of promissory notes assigned them to the plaintiff by a separate instru-
ment acknowledged before a notary and delivered to plaintiff without considera-
tion, but did not deliver the notes themselves. The defendant holds both notes,
one as indorsee for collection, and one as administrator of the payee's estate.
Held, that there was a valid gift of the notes. Burkett v. Doty (1917, Cal.)
167 Pac. 518.
As the notes were not delivered, it is clear that no title passed under the law
merchant or the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Ho.wever, as the rights
of a holder in due course are not involved, the assignment can be treated as
that of an ordinary chose in action. That choses in action are alienable is now
clearly recognized, at least where there is a consideration for the assignment
See Walter W. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 HARv. L.
REv. 8x6; (1917) 3o HARv. L. RFv. 449. At common law the assignee would
have to sue in the name of the payee. Gookin v. Richardson (1847) 1i Ala. 889;
Smalley v. Wright (1857) 44 Me. 442. By statute in nearly all states, however,
the assignee may now sue in his own name. National Bank v. McCullough
(i9o8) 5o Oreg. 5o8, 93 Pac. 356. The California court found no difficulty,
although the assignment was gratuitous, in recognizing the assignee as
owner. In that state all distinctions between sealed and unsealed instruments
have been abolished. Civ. Code, sec. 1629. As a result, gifts of realty and
personalty may be made without delivery by instruments in writing not under
seal. Driscoll v. Driscoll (19o4) 143 Cal. 528, 77 Pac. 471. In the principal case,
the same rule was applied to choses in action, the instrument in question being
regarded as a deed. The result reached seems both a sensible one and a
natural application of modern views as to the alienability of choses in action.
Cf. (1917) 26 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 304.
G. L. K.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAV-ADMIRALTY-STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
NOT APPLICABLE TO INJURIES WITHIN ADMIRALTY JURISDclTIoN-An employee
of a company operating a coastwise steamship line was accidentally killed while
engaged in the work of unloading a cargo at a pier in New York. In proceed-
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ings under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act, his widow and children
received an award which was approved by the New York Court of Appeals.
The case was taken by writ of- error to the United States Supreme Court. Held,
that the state compensation act, as applied to matters within admiralty juris-
diction, was in conflict with the -grant of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the
federal courts by the constitution, and was to that extent invalid, and the award
must be set aside. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 524. See
COMMENTS, p. 255.
CoNsTiTUTiONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS OF LAw-JUnsDlCTIO OwER Nox-REas-
DENT.In a suit in Minnesota by an insurance society to cancel the policy issued
by it on the life of the original defendant who was duly served with process but
died before trial, a statutory substitution was made of the beneficiaries as parties
defendant. One of these, a resident of California not served in Minnesota,
contested the jurisdiction of the Minnesota court. Held, that jurisdiction was
not obtained and that a judgment against the beneficiary would be a denial of
due process. National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security % Scheiber
(z9i7, Minn.) 163 N. W. 78r. See CoMMENTS, p. 252.
CoNSTiTUTioNAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF ComRACTS-JUDI-
crAL DncisioN.-Several interurban street car companies were merged, their
tracks connected and the entire set of properties then operated by the consoli-
dated company as one line of railway. The company later went into the hands
of receivers and the bonds of each of the constituent lines went to default.
Suits were brought by the trustees to foreclose separately each of the under-
lying mortgages. On a petition by the receivers setting forth that great injury
would be done to all creditors if several foreclosure proceedings were permitted,
since the property mortgaged was clearly more valuable as a unit than as a number
of stub lines, the trial court ordered a sale of the entire assets discharged of all
prior liens. The trustees appealed contending that the mortgage contracts with
the original companies had been impaired. Held, that the order below, even
though judicial action, did amount to an impairment under Article I, Section io,
of the Federal Constitution, and should be modified. Phila. Trust Co. v. North-
umberland County Trac. Co. (1917 Pa.) ioI AtL 907.
Although certain language in early United States Supreme Court opinions and
some decisions may be found in accord ,with the doctrine laid down in this case,
the tendency at the present time is certainly -toward the contrary interpre-
tation, namely, that legislative action is necessary to accomplish an uncon-
stitutional impairment of contract. Hanford v. Davies (1896) 163 U. S. 273, 278,
x6 Sup. Ct. 1051, 1053; Centl. Land Co. of W. Va. v. Laidley (1895) r59 U. S.
io3, Iog, 16 Sup. Ct 8o, 82; cf. Chicago v. Sheldon (1869 U. S.) 9 Wall. 5o, 56,
Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt (1853 U. S.) 16 How. 416, 432. Such would appear
to be the clear meaning of the words used in the impairment clause itself. Such
also is the accepted view where retroactive criminal law is concerned. Ross v.
Oregon (1912) 22 U. S: 150, 16l, 33 Sup. Ct. 22o, 222. The state courts, how-
ever, are at variance. Swanson v. Ottumwa (19o6) 131 Ia. 54o, 549-55o; io6
N. W. 9, 12-13; King v. Phoenix Ins. Co. of Bklyn. (1i06) 195 Mo. 290, 307,
92 S. W. 892, 896-897. Cf. Ruf v. Mueller (191) 49 Ind. App. 7, 12, 96 N. E.
612, 614. From the principal case it may be gathered that -Pennsylvania is hold-
ing to the interpretation which the United States courts have now abandoned.
But there seems to have been no necessity of invoking either state or federal
constitutional provisions in suppoit of the decision, since, without these grounds,
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reverse the lower court on the simple
law of contract For a discussion of a related topic, the treatment of judicial
decisions as denying due process under the Federal Constitution, see (1917)
27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 12r.
M. S. B.
CoNFLcT OF LAWS-CNTRACTs-RETROACTIVE MORAToRIUM AND DEPIVATION OF
INTEREST By LEX CoNTRAcTUs.-A German company having property in Great
Britain owed a debt to an English creditor under a contract to which, as regards
all ordinary aspects, the English court deemed the German rules of contract
applicable. A German retroactive ordinance postponed payment of claims until
further notification, with no interesd for this period of postponement. Held;
that the German ordinance was to be disregarded as contrary to the usage of
nations, and interest computed according to German law existing prior to the
ordinance. Re Fried Krupp Aktien-Gesellschaft (1917, Ch. D.) 137 L. T.
Rep. 21.
It is a general rule of English and American law that the lex contractus (that
is, either the lex loci contractus or the lex loci solutionis, as the case may be)
is the law which governs a contract not merely with regard to its creation but
with regard to all the conditions applicable to it as a contract. Gibbs v. Socifti
Industrielle (189o, C. A.) 25 Q. B. D. 399; Pritchard v. Norton (1882) io6
U. S. 124, 27 Sup. Ct 1o4. The same rule that applies to the primary obliga-
tion also governs the secondary obligation of a contract. See Atwood v. Walker
(xgoi) 179 Mass. 5x4, 61 N. E. 58; cf. Davis v. Mills (19o4) 194 U. S. 451,
24 Sup. Ct. 692; Are Secondary Contractual Obligations Governed by the Law
of the Contract? (1915) 25 YALZ, LAw JouRNAL 147. This rule is applied to
ordinary matters of discharge. Gibbs v. Socit& Industrielle, supra. And even
to a postponement of payment by a retroactive moratorium decree. Rouquette
v. Overman (1875) L. P. 1o Q. B. 525; see Moratorium Decrees and the Con-
flict of Laws (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 771. In the principal case, therefore,
prima facie the court should apply the German ordinance in question, but the
adoption of foreign laws "is to be regulated purely according to considerations
of justice, policy, expediency and international reciprocity." Moratorium Decrees
and the Conflict of Laws, ubi supra, at p. 772; see Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld,
The Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws (x9o9) 9 CL.
L. REv. 492, 496, 520. It is submitted that the court was wrong in declaring the
German ordinance contrary to the usage of nations. Brown v. Hiatts (1872,
U. S.) 15 Wall. 177; Du Belloix v. Lord Waterpark (z822, K. B.) i D. & R. 16.
Yet the decision is believed to be correct since, on general principles of the con-
flict of laws, it was proper to deny application of a statute of an enemy riation
prejudicial to British interests and against British public policy. Cf. Wolff v.
Oxholm (1817, K. B.) 6 M. & S. 92. See also The Halley (x868) L. L 2 P. C.
193; jKaufman v. Gerson (C. A.) [i9o4] i K. B. 591; Morisette v. Canadian Pac.
R. Co. (19o4) 76 Vt 267, 56 AtI. 11o2.
CoNIcr oF LAws-TRAS SR oF BoND IN FOREIGN STATE-LAw GOVERING
PURCHASE FOR VALuu-In a suit in Wisconsin to foreclose mortgage bonds
issued by a Wisconsin corporation in that state and delivered to the appellant
in New Mexico by a previous holder as collateral security for a pre-existing
debt, the appellant claimed to be a holder for value in due course according to
the law of New Mexico. The trial court excluded evidence as to the law of New
Mexico. Held, that the exclusion was proper since the Wisconsin law, not the
law of New Mexico, governed the question whether the appellant was "holder
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for value in due course." Badger Machinery Co. v. Columbia, etc., Lt. & Power
Co. (1917, Wis.) 163 N. W. 188. See Co sExts, p. 246.
CONTRACTs-AccEPTANcE-SuFFIcIENCy OF AcTs To CONSTITUTE ACCEPTANdE AS
MATTER OF LAw.-The defendant was put in possession of an old automobile
under an agreement, as alleged by him, to buy it, if he found it useful for his
business. He kept the machine for nearly two years, in the meantime having
offered it for sale, and then notified the plaintiff that he did not wish to buy it.
Held, that the defendant's acts constituted an acceptance as a matter of law.
Ostman v. Lee (1917, Conn.) IOI Atl. 23.
An acceptance is an act of the offeree whereby he exercises the power con-
ferred on him by the offeror. Professor Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance,
and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (917) 26 YALE LAw JoumAL, 199,
I81. The offeror at the beginning has full power to determine what acts are
to constitute an acceptance, and when he prescribes a certain mode the offeree
can accept in no other way. Weiner v. Gill (195o) 2 K. B. 172, 74 L. J. R. 845;
cf. Wheeler v. Klaholt (19O1) 178 Mass. 141, 59 N. E. 756. If no mode is
prescribed, any overt act which would lead a reasonable man to believe that
the offeree had assented, is considered an acceptance. Kirkham v. Attenborough
(1897) I Q. B. 201; Indiana Mfg. Co. v. Hayes (1893) 155 Pa. St. i6o, 26 Atl.
6; Hobbs v. Massassoit Whip Co. (1893) i8 Mass. 194, 33 N. E. 495. But
silence is generally not so construed, not even when the offeror has prescribed
it as the mode of acceptance. Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) I1 C. B. N. S. 869;
Prescott v. Jones (1898) 69 N. H. 305, 41 AUt. 352; cf. Emery v. Cobbey (1889)
27 Neb. 621, 43 N. W. 410; Hanson v. Wittenberg (1gio) 2o5 Mass. 319, 91 N. E.
383. Whether acts constitute an acceptance within the rule above stated is
ordinarily a question for the jury. Wheeler v. Klaholt, supra. In the principal
case the acts done would seem clearly sufficient to justify a finding in accordance
with the decision, but it may be doubted whether the inference was so clear as
to justify the cburt in deciding it as a matter of law.
C.I.
CoNTRAcT s-AsSzGNAiLrr-FuTu E Book AccouNTs-The plaintitt's assignor
had advanced money to the defendant company on notes which were secured by
an assignment of present and future book accounts. The notes were not paid,
and the plaintiff filed a bill in equity to enforce the assignment. Soon there-
after, the defendant was adjudged bankrupt, and its trustee defended the
action. Held, that the assignment in so far as it concerned future book
accounts could not be enforced against the defendant or its trustees, since there
had been no act indicating a taking of possession on the part of the grantee
after the accounts came into existence. Taylor v. Barton-Childs Co. (1917,
Mass.) .117 N. E. 43.
The court treats this case as governed by the same principles as mortgages
of future-acquired chattels. This treatment is a logical recognition of the fact
that, by gradual development of the law, an assignment of a chose in action
has come to be a real transfer of property. But the Massachusetts rule is
exceptional on mortgages of future-acquired chattels, holding them to be mere
executory contracts, unenforceable either in law or equity unless the mortgagee
has taken possession after acquisition by the mortgagor. Jones v. Richardson
(1845, Mass.) io Metc. 481; Moody v. Wright (1847, Mass.) 13 Metc. 17; see
in accord Ross v. Wilson (1869, Ky.) 7 Bush 29. This is contrary to the general
rule which protects such mortgages in equity. Mitchell v. Winslow (1843) 2
Story 630; Holroyd v. Marshall -(1862) io H. L. Cas. 19o. The same rule has
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been very generally applied to future-acquired choses in action. Toilby v.
Official Receiver (1888) 13 App, Cas. 523; Union Trust Co. v. Bulkely (19o7,
C. C. A. 6th) 15o Fed. 510. In view of its doctrine as to chattels, Massachusetts
has gone a long way in upholding assignments of future wages based on the
expected continuance of an existing employment, though the employment is
terminable at will. Boylen v. Leonard (1861) 2 Allen 4o7. An analogy might
possibly have been drawn between wages to be earned under an existing but
indefinite employment, and book accounts to arise in the natural course of an
existing business. In refusing to draw such an analogy the court has made it
clear that the doctrine of the wages cases is not to be extended, and the result
is to be commended in so far as it tends toward the consistent application of
the same rule to all classes of future-acquired personalty. M. B.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-COLLATERAL CoNTRAcT.-An architect sued upon a
contract with the defendants for services in the preparation- of plans and speci-
fications for a building. The building was to contain a motion picture theatre and
also dwellings, bathhouse, and stores in the cellar. A statute provided that, "No
portion of any building used for moving pictures hereafter erected . . . shall be
occupied or used as a dwelling or tenement house, apartment house, hotel, or
department store." Act of June 9, I91i (P. L. 746). Held, that the architect
was a party to an agreement to do an unlawful act and hence could not recover.
Medoff v. Fisher et al. (1917, Pa.) ioi AUt. 471.
A collateral contract may be so far removed from the unlawful object of one of
the parties as to be itself legal. Rogers v. Walter (1817, Tenn.) 4 Hayw. 205.
Some Courts have held that where the illegal act ultimately contemplated is greatly
opposed to public policy, mere knowledge on the part of the contractor is suf-
ficient to make the collateral contract unenforceable. Hanauer v. Doane (I87O)
x2 Wall. 342 (treason); Pearce v. Brooks (i866) L. R. i Ex. 213 (prostitution).
On the other hand where the illegal act intended by one is a crime of minor
importance, mere knowledge by the other of such intention does not make the
contract unenforceable by the latter. Brooks v. Martin (1863) 2 Wall. 7o;
Thomas v. Brady (1848) io Pa. St. 164. Yet the distinction between great and
small crimes is at best hard to draw. Where, however, the plaintiff has par-
ticipated in the intent or has aided and abetted its fulfilment, he cannot enforce
his contract, irrespective of the magnitude of the offense intended. Rose v.
Mitchell (i88I) 6 Colo. bo2; Graves v. Johnson (892) 156 Mass. 211, 30 N. E.
818; (i9O) i79 Mass. 53, 6o N. E. 383; Webber v. Donnelly (1876) 33 Mich.
469. If the drawing of the plans is to be regarded as a participation in the intent
or as aiding and abetting the ultimate illegal act, the principal case is clearly
sound. F. C. H.
CONTRACT-PRFORMANCE BY INSTALMENTS-ANTICIPATORY BREAcn.-An instal-
ment contract provided that the seller should deliver coal daily from December
28, i909, to March 30, i9io, and that the buyer should pay before the tenth of
each month for the coal delivered during the previous month. On January 1o,
the purchaser failed to pay for the December coal and the seller at once stopped
deliveries. The payment was made and accepted on January i5 at which time the
vendor gave notice of cancellation. Coal delivered from January I to January 9
remained unpaid for even after the tenth of February. Action was brought by
the buyer to recover for failure to deliver the rest of the coal. Held, that the
failure of the plaintiff to make proper payments on the contract after the repudia-
tion was fatal to his cause of action. Chicago Washed Coal Co. v. Whitsett
(1917, Ill.) 116 N. F_ 115.
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The decision might have been rested on the plaintiff's first breach under the
prevailing American rule which treats as vital a default in one instalment, though
not accompanied by insolvency or repudiation as required by English cases.
Rugg v. Moore (i885) nio Pa. St. 236, 1 Atl. 32o; Wald's Pollock, Contracts
(Williston's ed.) 332, note; cf. Freeth v. Burr (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 2o8; Mersey
Steel & Iron Co. v. Naylor (1884) 9 A. C. 434. The court, however, did not
discuss this point, but assuming the defendant's failure to deliver coal as the
first "vital breach," saw only two courses open to the plaintiff if he wished to
recover for loss of the contract. He could "treat the contract as terminated"
and sue at once, or treat it as subsisting and sue at the end of the term. But in
the latter case, he had to show complete performance on his part and keep the
contract alive for the benefit of all parties. This is the English doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation. Hochster v. De la Tour (1852, Q. B.) 2 E. & B. 678.
Its application to an actual breach may be attributed to the peculiar Illinois rule
that, though a breach in one instalment, without repudiation, excuses the other
party from going on, he cannot, after ceasing performance on this ground,
recover damages for the loss of the contract. Keeler v. Clifford (1897) i65 Ill.
544, 46 N. E. 248. Hence the court apparently considered that the plaintiffs'
rights rested not on the defendant's breach, but on the accompanying repudiation.
This seems an unfortunate departure from the general rule that any actual breach
which excuses further performance gives an immediate right of action for loss
of the entire contract. Pierce v. Tennessee etc. Co. (1898) 173 U. S. i, 19 Sup.
Ct. 335; Wald's Pollock, Contracts (Williston's ed.) 363, n. 2o.
M. B.
CornAcTs-THm PARTY BENEICIARY-BoND To SEcuRE PAYMENT OF
MATEaiAL MEN-The defendant, as surety, gave a bond to the Passaic Valley
Sewerage Commissioners to secure the performance of a building contract The
bond was conditioned to be void, "if the contractor shall pay for all labor and
materials furnished and shall perform all the obligations of his contract" The
plaintiff, having furnished materials, sued upon the bond. Held, that the plaintiff
was not a beneficiary within the meaning of a statute (Comp. St. 1910, p. 4059,
sec. 28) giving a right of action to third parties for whose benefit a contract is
made, the bond being solely to indemnify the obligee. Standard Gas Power Corp.
v. New England Casualty Co. (1917, N. J. Ct. Err.) Ioi Atl. 28L.
A third party beneficiary is allowed to sue in New Jersey, whether he is acreditor or a donee beneficiary. Berry v. Doremus (1863, Sup. Ct.) 3o N. J. L.
399; Joslin v. New Jersey Car Spring Co. (873, Sup. Ct.) 36 N. J. L. 141;
Whitehead v. Burgess (i897, Sup. Ct.) 6I N. J. L. 75. The court in the principal
case denies a remedy to the plaintiff solely on the ground that he was not
intended as a beneficiary. As a general proposition, public property is not the
subject of a mechanic's lien. Frank v. Hudson Co. (1877, Sup. Ct.) 39 N. J. L.
347. If such were the case here the plaintiff should have been given the right
to sue as the sole beneficiary; for the obligee would then have no interest of
his own to protect by securing payment of the material men, and the latter must
have been intended as beneficiary. Baker v. Bryan (1884) 64 Ia. 56i, 21 N. W.
83; King v. Downey (1899) 24 Ind. App. 262, 56 N. E. 68o. By statute in New
Jersey, however, a mechanic's lien on public property is given. Commissioners
v. Fell (1894, Ch.) 52 N. J. E. 689, 29 At. 816; Act of Mar. 30, 1892 (3 Comp.
St. p. 3315) P. L. 1892 p. 369, as amended P. L. igo9 p. 26o. Under such a
statute it is a reasonable inference that the bond is one of indemnity to protect
the obligee against loss that might result from the filing of liens. This tends
to show that the bond in the principal case was not in fact made for the benefit
of the material men. In other jurisdictions material men have been allowed to
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maintain suit on such a bond irrespective of the question whether or not a
material man has a lien on public buildings. School District v. Livers (1899)
147 Mo. 580, 49 S. W. 507; Kaufmann v. Cooper (1896) 46 Neb. 644, 65 N. W_
796. By Federal statutes (3o St 9o6, ch. 218, 33 St 811, c. 778) material men
are expressly given the right to sue in the name of the United States on con-
struction bonds given to the government. Equitable Surety Co. v. McMillan
(1913) 234 U. S. 448, 34 Sup. Ct. 803; Illinois Surety Co. v. Davis Co. (1916)
37 Sup. Ct.. 614.
F. C. H.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-NATURE OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT-EFFECT OF
RLwASE BY DEDENT.-The husband of the plaintiff while a passenger on a car
of the defendant corporation received injuries which ultimately resulted in death.
Before his death he had executed a release of liability to the defendant. The
widow brought suit under a statute which provides that: "When the death of a
person . . . is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or
personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against the person
causing the death, ..... " Held, that, the release by the husband was not a bar
to the plaintiff's cause of action. Earley v. Pacific El. R. Co. (1917, Cal.) 167
Pac. 514.
By the common law the death of a human being could not be complained of
as a civil injury. Baker v. Bolton (i8o8) I Camp. 493. In 1846 Lord Campbell's
Act-the foundation, with various modifications, of subsequent American legisla-
tion-created a new right of action in favor of the persons for whose benefit
a suit by the decedent's administrator or executor was authorized. Blake v.
Midland Ry. Co. (1852) 18 Q. B. 93, iio. It was not a "survival act" and hence
the injured person's right of action still terminated with his death. Pulling v.
Great Eastern Ry. Co. (1882) L. R. 9 Q. B. D. iio. But Lord Campbell's Act
gave the new right subject to the condition that the injury must be "such as
would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to main-
tain an action and recover damages in respect thereof." 9 & Io Vict. (1846)
c. 93. Consequently a release by the injured person would bar a suit for the
benefit of the widow or other relatives. Read v. Great East. Ry. Co. (1868)
3 Q. B. 555. The courts in this country in construing statutes with a similar
clause-have followed the English decisions. Southern, etc. Co. v. Cassin (i9oo)
III Ga. 575, 36 S. E. 881; Jones v. Kansas City Ry. Co. (I9O3) 178 Mo. 528, 77
S. W. 890. But there are a number of statutes in this country which do not
contain such a provision and under such statutes a release given by-the injured
party -does not bar the beneficiaries' right of action. Eichorn v. New Orleans,
etc. Co. (i9o4) 112 La. 236, 36 So. 335. Donahue v. Drexler (884) 82 Ky. 157.
Similarly, in states which have a "survival act" and also an act creating a new
and separate cause of action, recovery under one should not logically bar
recovery under the other; and some courts so hold. Davis v. St. Louis, etc.
R. Co. (189o) 54 Ark. 389, 13 S. W. 8Oi. Stewart v. United Electric Light &
Power Co. (i9o6) 104 Md. 332, 65 Atl. 49. Contra, Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. McElwain (896) 98 Ky. 700, 34 S. W. 236. The difficulty, both in the
decisions and in the legislation, has arisen from a failure to recognize that two
independent rights are involved, one being that of the injured person, the other
that of the next of kin not to be injured in support.
J. N. M.
EJECTMENT-ENCROACHING BAY WINDOW AND EAvEs.-The bay window and
eaves of the defendant's house projected nearly five feet over the line of the
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adjoining owner who brought an action of ejectment to recover possession of
the strip of land thus encroached upon. Held, that the action could be main-
tained. McDivitt v. Bronson (1917, Neb.) 163 N. W. 761.
See COMMENTS, p. 265.
EQuITY JURISDICTIoN-CoRPORATIoNs-ITERNAL AFFAIRS OF A FOREIGN Compo-
RATIo.-A bill was filed by the minority stockholders of a foreign corporation
to prevent a majority of the directors from winding up the business and selling
the corporate property to another company, in which the defendant directors
owned nearly all the stock. Held, that the relief asked for might properly be
given, even though it involved an interference with the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation. Corry v. Barre Granite and Quarry Co. (1917, Vt.) loi
At. 38.
The rule has been laid down very generally, and is often very broadly stated,
that a court of equity will not attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation. Howell v. Chicago R. R. (1868 N. Y. Sup.
Ct) 51 Barb. 378; Van Dyke v. Railway Mail Assoc. (1912) 118 Minn. 390, 137
N. W. 15. It is the modern tendency to limit the application of this rule.
Some courts have accomplished this by narrowing the definition of internal
affairs. Guilford v. Western Union TeL Co. (1894) 59 Minn. 332, 6I N. W. 324.
Cf. North State Copper Min. Co. v. Field (1885) 64 Md. 151, 20 At. lO39. The
true rule is not one of jurisdiction, strictly speaking, but one of sound judgment
and discretion, depending on the facts in each case. Babcock v. Farwell (igio)
245 Ili. 14, 91 N. E. 683; Ives z'. Smith (1888, Sup. Ct) 3 N. Y. Supp. 645, 651.
Two sound reasons for applying the rule are the practical difficulty of enforcing
the decree effectively against a foreign corporation, and the danger of confusion
through opposite decisions, in different jurisdictions, on the same right in the
case of different individuals. Kimball v. St. Louis R. R. (1892) 157 Mass. 7,
31 N. E. 697; Madden v. Electric Light Co. (1897) 181 Pa. St 617, 37 Atl. 817.
Where these two reasons do not apply the court may well proceed. On this
ground the decision in the principal case seems sound.
EQUITY-LAcHES-PURSUING MIsTACEN REMEDmS FOR 25 YEARSs.-The defend-
ant company was charged with using its control of the majority of the stock
of a railroad corporation to gain an inequitable advantage over the minority
stock holders. A series of legally misdirected and unsuccessful suits were
brought by the minority stock holders who finally filed the present bill 25 years
after the cause of action had arisen, in which for the first time they were held
to have conceived their remedy correctly. Held, that the suit was not barred
by laches. Bogert v. Southern Pacific Co. (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 244 Fed. 61.
The general rule followed in state courts is that where equity and law have
concurrent jurisdiction the statute of limitations is a bar in equity. Tucker v.
Linn (i9o4, N. J. Ch.) 57 Atl. 17. Apparently where equitable jurisdiction is
exclusive, except where the statute expressly applies to equitable proceedings,
state courts act only on analogy. Wood, Limitations (4 th ed.) sec. 59; see
Hall v. Law (188o) 1O2 U. S. 46, 26 L. Ed. 217. In both state and federal
courts, in cases where equitable jurisdiction is exclusive and where unusual
conditions make it inequitable to forbid the maintenance of a suit even though
a longer period than that fixed by the statute of limitations has elapsed, the
question whether laches will bar the complaint will be determined by the equities
which condition it Kelley v. Boettcher (1898, C. C. A. 8th) 85 Fed. 55, 62;
Stevens v. Grand Central Min. Co. (19o4, C. C. A. 8th) 133 Fed. 28. The better
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rule is that laches is not mere delay but delay that works a disadvantage or
change of position. Chase v. Chase (897) 20 P. I. 207, 37 Atl. 8o4. Pomeroy,
Eq. Rem. secs. 2o-23 and note to sec. 23. The pendency of another action
relating to the same matter is frequently accepted as an excuse to overcome the
defense of laches. Schaefer v. City of Fond du Lac (i899) io4 Wis. 39, 80
N. W. 59; Williams v. Neeley (i9o4, C. C. A. 8th) 134 Fed. I. Where there
had been continuous litigation for 2o years in various suits and proceedings
against the defendant upon the question in issue, the complainant has been held
not to be chargeable with laches. Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd (1913, C. C. A. 9th)
177 Fed. 8o4, 822. Cases where actions have been maintained after so long a
period are unusual, yet, where such delay has not been prejudicial, and constant
effort has been made in the meantime to obtain relief, there seems to be no
sound reason why relief should not be given in equity..
R. L. S.
EQUITY-MANDATORY INJUNCTION-ENCROACHMENT OF FOUNDATION WALL
BELOW THE SuaRAc.-After the plaintiff had procured a judgment in an: action
of ejectment by reason of the encroachment of the defendant's foundation wall
below the surface, and had had execution issued thereon, the sheriff failed to
remove the encroaching wall because the existing conditions made such removal
impossible without trespassing on the defendant's land. Thereupon the plaintiff
applied for a mandatory injunction to compel the defendant himself to remove
the obstruction. Held, that the injunction should issue. Hirschberg v. Flusser
(I917, N. J. Ch.) ioi At. i9i.
See CommENTs, p. 265.
EQUrTY-SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE-MUTUALITY-PLAINTIFF HAVING OPTION TO
TEamiATE LEASE.-The plaintiff was assignee of an oil lease which gave the
lessee an option to terminate the lease at any time on payment of $I. The
lessors, being dissatisfied, undertook to declare the lease forfeited, and executed
a second lease of the same kind to other parties. The plaintiff sought to enjoin
the lessors and the new lessees from entering on the land in alleged violation
of the covenants in his lease. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to an
injunction to prevent such breach, because the contract was not mutual. Advance
Oil Co. v. Hunt et al. (1917, Ind.) ii6 N. E. 34o. See Co mNTs, p. 261.
EVENcE-ADnIssloN OF LinITY.-In an action arising from a collision
between the defendant's automobile, driven by his son, and the plaintiff's team,
the only evidence given to show that the necessary relation of master and servant
existed between the father and son was the admission of the father that "so far
as the liability extended, he was responsible." Held, that this admission of
liability was a drrect admission of facts essential to establish his legal liability.
Farnham v. Clifford (1917, Me.) ioi At. 468.
The admission of the defendant is a conclusion arrived at by the process of
reasoning, applying the rules of law to the totality of non-legal facts. Such a
conclusion is commonily called a conclusion of law, though more correctly termed
a conclusion of mixed law and fact. An admission of law made by a party
will not be noticed by the court, the determination of the rules of law being
for the court and not for the parties. Polk's Lessee v. Cockrel (i8og) I Tenn.
436. It has been held that an admission of liability, since it involves a question
of law as well as of fact, falls within the same rule and is inadmissible.
Crockett v. Morrison (1847) 1I Mo. 3. But the majority of cases would allow
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admissions of liability to go in as some evidence of the non-legal facts upon
which the conclusion, if correct, must necessarily be based, though not con-
clusive. Detroit v. Beckman (r876) 34 Mich. 125; cf. Pattors v. Frost-Johnson
Co. (1917, La.) 76 So. 58o. So an admission of debt made not in the course of
negotiations for compromise (if made at such time, it is excluded on grounds
of public policy) is admissible. Draper v. Horton (igoI) 22 R- . 592, 48 Atl.
945; Colburn v. Groton (1889) 66 N. H. 151 28 At. 95; Chamberlayne, Ev-
dence, § i443. An admission of liability in civil proceedings would seem to be
analogous to a confession in criminal law, both being admissions of legal lia-
bility-one to make compensation and the other to suffer punishment. The
Maine court therefore rightly admitted the admission of liability. But it was
inaccurate in stating that this was "a direct admission of facts essential to
establish his legal liability." It was a direct admission of his legal liability,
from which the jury could infer that the non-legal facts existed, which, com-
bined with the rules of law, would give rise to the mixed conclusion of legal
liability. On principle, such an admission should be admitted. The danger that
the defendant may have been laboring under a misapprehension, either of fact
or of law, is offset by the opportunity of explanation. Furthermore, the facts
which the jury may thus infer are facts which the defendant very likely would
not testify to directly. Accordingly, just as under the so-called "Opinion Rule"
with respect to opinions of witnesses on the stand, the opinion as to his liability
thould be admitted as a distinct aid to the jury in determining facts which could
not easily be otherwise placed before them.
W. W. G.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-FAILURE TO QuArFY-INxDvmuAL LIABILrTy OF OrrI-
cEs AmD DrREcToRs.-A marine corporation did business in Illinois without
having complied with the Illinois statutory Tequirements relating to foreign
corporations. The plaintiff, who had had transactions with the corporation in
the corporate name, sued the defendants--officers, agents and directors of the
foreign corporation, some of whom had no direct connection with the transac-
tions involved-claiming that they were individually liable. Held, that the
defendants were individually liable. Ryerson & Son v. Shaw (1917) 277 Ill. 524,
115 N. E. 65o. See CoMMNrs, p. 248.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-SOVEREIGN STATE AS PLAINTIFF-WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
FROM INTERPLEADER OF THIRD PERSON BY DEFENDANT-The Kingdom of Rou-
mania instituted suit against the Guaranty Trust Company to recover a certain
fund. An individual, claiming part of the fund, brought suit against both
Roumania and the Trust Company, the agent of the Roumanian Government.
The Trust Company sought to have the individual interpleaded. Held, that
where a foreign government voluntarily becomes a party to a suit by bringing
an action, it waives its immunity from an interpleader of a third party, requested
by the defendant. Semble, that where a sovereign state becomes a partner in a
commercial enterprise, it loses to that extent its immunity from suit. Kingdom
of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 244 Fed. Rep. 195.
A sovereign cannot be forced into court by suit. De Haber v. Queen of
Portugal (i85i) 17 Q. B. 171, i96. And this personal exemption of a sovereign
from foreign jurisdiction is not lost by reason of his assuming a false name.
Mighell v. Sultan of Johare (C. A.) [894] I Q. B. 149. But if a sovereign
sues, the defendant may counterclaim to the extent of defeating the claim, and
may file a cross bill or take other proceedings in order that complete justice
may be done, and a sovereign may also be named as defendant in order to
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give him notice of a claim which the plaintiff makes to funds in the hands of
a third person over whom the court has jurisdiction. See Strousberg v. Republic
of Costa Rica (i88o, C. A.) 44 L. T. Rep. . S. 199. But a sovereign by bringing
suit does not submit to a cross action, and another claim arising from a different
and distinct matter may not be set up. South African Republic v. La Compagnie
Franco Beige [1898] 1 Ch. i9o. By statute in the United States, 'however, a
defendant sued by the United States may set off any credit, whether arising
out of the same transaction or another, which would defeat the claim of the
United States in whole or in part. United States v. Wilkins (1821, U. S.) 6
Wheat. 135. The sovereign is immune, however, from an affirmative judgment in
favor of the defendant. People v. Dennison (i88r) 84 N. Y. 272; United States
v. Eckford (1867, U. S.) 6 Wall. 484. In Germany where the defendant was
given judgment on a counter claii, the property of the sovereign plaintiff in
Germany was held not subject to execution. Von Hellfeld v. Russia (19Io)
5 Am. Jour. of Int. Law 490. However, if a sovereign power commences
proceedings, it must conform to the practice and regulations of the court, such
as giving discovery, etc. United States v..Prioleau (1866, V. C.) 14 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 7oo. The decision in the principal case, while raising a novel point, seems
in line with established principles.
The proposition, also supported by the principal case, that where a foreign
government becomes a partner in, any trading company, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and assumes that of a private person, is not free from doubt.
It is approved in a dictum in The Charkieh (1873) L R. 4 A. & E. 59, 99.
Other dicta to the same effect are cited in an article by Nathan Wolfman,
Sovereigns as Defendants (19io) 4 Ams. Joui. oF INT. LAW, 373. It has found
some support in the decisions of certain continental courts, e. g., those of Belgium
and Italy, where the distindtion of administrative law between acte de gouverne-
ment and acte de gestion is accepted. De Paepe, Etude sur la Competence Civile
Sl'Fgard des Etats Etrangers, Brussels, 1894; C. F. Gabba in z5 Clunet (1888)
i8o-i9i, 16 Clunet (889) 538-554 and I7 Clunet (i89o) 27-41 and 51 Giurispru-
denza Italiana (x888) 65-8o. See criticism of. the Italian decisions in two articles
by Dionisio Anilotti in 5 Zeitschr. fir Int. Privat u. Strafrecht (1895), 24-37
and 138-147. But there is weighty authority to the effect that even in such case
the courts will not proceed against the person or the property of a sovereign.
The Parlement Beige (88o, C. A.) 5 P. D. 197, 216.; Mason v. Intercolonial
Railway of Canada (i9o8) 197 Mass. 349, 83 N. E. 876.
JUDGMENTS-BAR OF FORmFR JUDG ENT-SuccEssrvE AcrIoNs FOR SEDUCrIO"
AND BREACH OF PRomisE.-In an action for breach of promise the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant promised to marry her, and later took advantage of such
promise to seduce her, and that he failed to keep his promise. The defendant
pleaded a judgment obtained against him by the plaintiff in a prior action for
the seduction in which the breach of promise was also set forth in the com-
plaint. Held, that the judgment in the first action .barred the second, as both
actions must be considered as resting on the same wrong for which recovery
could not be had twice. Rieger v. Abrams (1917, Wash.) 167 Pac. 76.
A former judgment on the merits on the same cause of action, though under
a different form of remedy, is generally a bar to a subsequeht action. Hodge
v. Shaw (1892) 85 Ia. 137, 52 N. W. 8. 2 Black, Judgments, sec. 725. But
here the causes of action are not the same. They arose at different times, and
the evidence necessary and sufficient to prove one would not prove 'the other.
It is true that, by the majority view, if the first suit had been for breach of
promise the plaintiff could have proved seduction to aggravate the damages.
Lanigan v. Neely (1907) 4 Cal. App. 760, 89 Pac. 441; Spelling v. Parks (igoo)
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1o4 Tenn. 351, 58 S. W. x26. Of course in such a case, if a complete recovery
is sought and allowed, it is a bar to further action. See Lanigan v. Neely, supra.
But the plaintiff need not bring in the seduction if she preferred to keep it for
a separate suit. The rule that-a party cannot split up his cause of action refers
only to claims which constitute a part of one inseparable cause of action.
Brunsden v. Humphrey (1884) L. R. 14 Q. B. D. i41. Cf. Goodrich v. Yale
(1867) 97 Mass. 15. Here the plaintiff apparently sued for the seduction first
and, if so, it seems clear that she could not properly be allowed to recover in
such action full damages for the subsequent breach of promise, and a second
action should therefore be allowed. The complaints in both actions were
loosely drawn, however, and possibly the opinion should be interpreted as
proceeding on the assumption that the first suit was actually tried as one for
breach of promise with the seduction to aggravate the damages. If this
assumption was warranted by the facts, the decision would of course be correct.
S. J. T.*
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-ToLLING OF STATUTE-TENVER OF PART PAYMENT.
A debtor tendered $5o on a $5,ooo debt with a statement that he would pay more
when he got the money. The tender was rejected as too small to be worth
taking. Held, that such tender was sufficient acknowledgment of the debt to
lift the bar of the statute. In re Maniatakis' Estate (f9i7, Pa.) ioi At. 920.
It is good public policy to put an end to litigation. Buf it is alio good
policy that debtors be compelled to pay their debts. Hence it is held that under
certain circumstances the bar of the statute of limitations should be lifted and
the creditor allowed to recover. Part payment accompanied by circumstances
warranting the inference that the debtor intends to pay the balance takes the
debt out of the statute. Weenz v. Wenz (1916) 2= Mass. 314, 110 N. E. 969;
Canal Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Ascension (1916) i4O La. 465, 73 So. 269.
The same effect is given to an unconditional promise to pay, whether the
promise is expressed or implied. Herrington v. Davis (1914) 145 N. Y. Supp.
452; Shaw v. Oliver (1914) 112 Me. 512, 92 At. 652. And promises to pay have
been implied from very ambiguous language. Burden v. McElhenny (18ig,
S. C.) 2 Nott & M. 6o, io Am. Dec. 57o; cf. Hornblower v. George
Washington University (i9o8, D. C.) 31 App. Cas. 64. When words are enough
to warrant inference of a promise, there seems to be no good reason why acts
should not be. Senniger v. Rowley (igo8) 138 Iowa, 617, 116 N. W. 695.
The extension of the doctrine to a case of an unaccepted part tender seems
wholly sound and wise, provided the circumstances are such as to warrant the
implication of a promise to pay the rest. If the circumstances do not warrant
such implication, the bar should be lifted only to the extent of the tender. The
difficulty with the principal decision is that the inference to be drawn from
the tender with reference to further payment would seem to be controlled by the
accompanying words of promise, which the court held too indefinite in them-
selves to remove the bar of the statute. It is difficult to see how the tender
made the promise any more definite.
C. I.
NUISANCE-WHETHER PROPERTY INTEREST NECESSARY TO RECOvERY-DEATH BY
WRONGFUL AcT-Under a statute providing that "a father may maintain an
action for the injury or death of a child," the plaintiff sought to recover for the
death of his minor son, caused by a nuisance maintained by the defendant near
the premises occupied by the plaintiff's family, but owned by the plaintiff's wife.
Held, that the plaintiff could recover, regardless of his lack of interest in the
real estate, the elements of damage.being the value of the child's services during
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his minority, and the expenses incurred because of his injury and death. Pere
Marquette R. Co. v. Chadwick (1917, Ind. App.) 115 N. E. 678.
The old common law assize of nuisance was maintainable only by the tenant-
of the freehold. 3 Bl. Com. 22o-223. An action oir the case for damages for
interference by nuisance with the use and enjoyment of property is maintainable
by one in possession. Bentley v. Atlanta (1893) 92 Ga. 623, 18 S. E. 1013. But
the cases are in conflict ('due, it is submitted, to confusion into which the courts
seem to fall when the element of nuisance is introduced) whether a plaintiff
having no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises may recover for a
nuisance which injures his health. Recovery was allowed in Ft. Worth, etc.
R. Co. v. Glenn (i9o4) 97 Tex. 586, 8o S. W. 992; Hosmer v. Republic Iron Co.
(913) I79 Ala. 415, 6o So. 8oi; Hunt v. Lowell (1864, Mass.) 8 Allen i69;
contra, Ellis v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co. (1865) 63 Mo. I31. The principal case
adopts the affirmative view and makes a novel application of it to a situation
where the nuisance injures not the plaintiff's health but his common law and
statutory right to his child's services. At common law the father could recover
for loss of services only up to the time of the child's death. Osborn v. Gillett
(1873) L. R. 8 Ex. 88. The statute gives him a new right of action for lost
services from the time of death until the child would have reached majority.
Mayhew v. Burns (I885) 1O3 Ind. 328, 333, 2 N. E. 793, 796. The defendant,
however, is liable to the parent only if he would have been liable to the child
had the latter been injured, but not killed. Ohio & Miss. R. Co. v. Tindall
(1859) 13 Ind. 366. In adopting the view of liability for nuisance which
impairs health regardless of proprietary interest and in applying it to the
principal case, the court reaches, it is submitted, a sound conclusion.
C. S. B.
QUASI-CONTRACTS--RIGHT TO RETURw OF ENGAGEMENT RING ON BREAcH OF
PROMISE TO MAmy.-The defendant broke an engagement to marry and the
plaintiff brought an action for recovery of the engagement ring. Held, that the
plaintiff could recover, since there is an implied condition that the ring shall be
returned if the engagement is broken. Jacobs v. Davis [1917] 2 K. B. 532.
When the defendant breaks a contract, the plaintiff has an action in assumpsit
or the alternative remedy of suing for the value of the benefit received by the
defendant. Brown v. Woodbury (903) 183 Mass. 279, 67 N. E. 327. Kicks v.
State Bank of Lisbon (I9O4) 12 N. D. 576, 98 N. W. 4o8. The breach, however,
must be one so materially affecting the contract as to have the same effect as
an absoltte repudiation thereof. Cornwall v. Henson, (C. A.) [igoo] 2 Ch. 298.
Rhymney Ry. Co. v. Brecon, etc., Ry. Co. (i9oo, C. A.) 69 L. J. Ch. 813, 83 L. T.
Rep. N. S. III. The court in the principal case went one step further and
allowed the plaintiff to redover the specific article, treating the delivery of the
ring either as a pledge, or as a gift subject to a condition subsequent defeating
the gift in case the marriage is not consummated. However, it is submitted that
the real duty enforced by the court was of an equitable nature, more closely
allied to quasi-contract than to contract, based on the principle that the defendant
after repudiating a contract should not be allowed to keep articles given in
reliance upon the contract and in expectation of its performance. See Robinson
v. Cumming (1742, Ch.) 2 Atk. 4o9.
J. N. M.
TORTS-NGLIGENCE OF MANUFACTURER-RESTAURANT KEEPER'S LIABILITY TO
GuEsT.-The plaintiff, who ordered at the defendant's restaurant a piece of
cake, baked and prepared for serving by the defendant, was injured by biting
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upon a metallic nail concealed in the cake. Held, that the defendant was not
liable. Jacobs v. Childs Co. (1917, N. Y. Mun. Ct.) 166 N. Y. Supp. 798.
The court says that this case is indistinguishable in principle from Hasbrouck
v. Armour & Co. (i9op) 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. i57. That was a suit for
injuries sustained from using a piece of soap containing a concealed needle.
But in that case the soap had been manufactured by the defendant, sold to a
retailer and purchased from the retailer by the plaintiff, so that there
was no privity of contract between the manufacturer and the plaintiff.
The principles applicable to such a situation were discussed in MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. (igi6) 217 N. Y. 382, I1 N. E. io5o; commented
upon in 25 YALE LAw JOURxAL 67g. In the principal case, however,
there was privity of contract between the defendant manufacturer of
the cake and the injured plaintiff. It is true that there is no implied war-
ranty on the part of the restaurant keeper that the food he serves shall be
wholesome and fit for consumption. Merrill v. Hodson (914) 88 Conn. 314,
9i At. 533; see 24 YALE LAW JouRTAL 73. But it would seem that where there
is privity of contract between the purchaser and the manufacturer of food it
may well be held that there is a duty of care in preparing the food which would
render the manufacturer liable for injuries due to a foreign substance, such as
a nail, contained in the food. Whatever one may think of the policy of exempt-
ing manufacturers from liability for injuries sustained by a third person who
dealt only with the retailer, as in the Hasbrouck case, it is clear that such a
decision is not a precedent for the principal case. It is regrettable that the court
did not note this distinction and discuss more thoroughly the real point involved
in the facts before it. The distinction taken in the opinion between a foreign
substance of a sort which is used in manufacturing the article-as a needle
concealed in the seam of a flannel garment-and a foreign substance of a sort
having no connection with the manufacture-as a nail concealed in cake-seems
of doubtful validity.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-PoC.EEDS OF INSURANCE--ETENT1ON AS SEcuny.-
The defendant sold to the plaintiff, as one transaction, a farm and the chattels
thereon for $3ooo. The plaintiff gave the defendant a mortgage on the chattels
to secure the payment of $15oo of the whole purchase price. The vendor
retained the title to the real estate. The contract provided that the plaintiff
should keep the premises insured for the security of the defendant and that
upon the payment of the chattel mortgage the defendant should discharge the
mortgage and give the plaintiff a warranty deed of the land, taking a mortgage
on the real estate for $I5oo, the balance of the purchase price. The dwelling
was destroyed by fire. Neither party was willing to rebuild. The real estate
was now worth but $8oo. The plaintiff filed a bill praying that the insurance
money be applied in discharge of the chattel mortgage debt, then due, and that
a warranty deed of the land be delivered. Held, that the insurance money stood
in the place of the property destroyed and that the plaintiff could not require
its application to discharge the chattel mortgage. Baker v. Rushford (1917, Vt)
IOI Atl. 76.9.
No case has been found in which a situation similar to that in the principal
case was presented for decision. But see Thorp v. Croto (1907) 79 Vt 39o, 65
Adt. 562, io L. R. A. (N. S.) 1166 with note. In that case the mortgagee was
ordered to apply the proceeds of the insurance upon the mortgage debt as the
payments fell due. Part of the debt was due but no question as to the sufficiency
of the security was there raised. There are a number of cases in which it is said
that the insurance money takes the place of the property, but in those cases
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either no part of the mortgage debt was then due or the statement was made
by way of dictum. See Power v. Fire Ins. Co. (1897) 69 Vt. 494, 38 AtI. 148;
Naquin v. Tex. Savings Asso. (19o2) 95 Tex. 313, 67 S. W. 9o8, 58 L. R. A. 711;
Fergus v. Wilmarth (i886) 117 Ill. 543, 7 N. E. 508; Boutelle v. Minneapolis
City (1894) 59 Minn. 493, 6i N. W. 554; Brook & Berry v. Hubbard (1goi)
73 H. i22, 5o A. H. 8o2. Injunctions prohibitory of waste indicate the tendency
of courts of equity to protect the security of a vendor or mortgagee. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Bigler (i88o) 79 N. Y. 568. It is evident that the purpose of the
contract in the principal case was to give to the defendant reasonable security
for the mortgage debt. Compliance with the plaintiff's request would therefore
work a manifest injustice.
R. L. S.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SALE OF Two LOTS BY SEPARATE CoNTRACTs-EFECr
OF MISREPRESENTATION AS TO ONE ON CONTRACT FOR THE OTHELR-A purchaser con-
tracted for two lots from the same vendor, intending to use them together, but
without communicating this intention to the vendor. There was a misrepresenta-
tion as to the second lot and the purchaser rescinded that contract. He then
sought to rescind the contract for the first lot and the vendor asked for specific
performance. Held, that neither rescission to the purchaser nor specific perform-
ance to the vendor would be granted. Holliday v. Lockwood [19171 2 Ch. 47.
The case illustrates the doctrine that equity may consider certain facts in the
formation of a contract as insufficient to establish a claim for rescission but
sufficient to cause the court to refuse specific performance of the contract.
Mortlock v. Buller (18o4 Eng. Ch.) io Ves. 292; Scott v. Alvarez (C. A.)
[1895] 2 Ch. 603; Moffett, etc. Co. v. City of Rochester (1898 C. C. A. 2d) 9I
Fed. 28; and see Shaw, C. J. in Western R. R. Co. v. Babcock (Mass. 1843) 6
Met. 346, 352. The general rule is that the undisclosed intention or understand-
ing of one contracting party does not govern the contract, but he is bound by
the interpretation reasonably given to his words and acts by the other party.
Professor A. L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance (1917) 26 YALE LAw JoURNAL,
205; Hodgdon v. Mansfield (1888) 147 Mass. 304, 7 N. E. 544; Jacob Johnson
Fish Co. v. Hawley (i912) 150 Wis. 578, 137 N. W. 773. In the principal case
there were no such facts, in the absence of an express statement, as to lead the
vendor to regard the contracts as interdependent. Under the general rule above
stated they must therefore be regarded as separate contracts, and a misrepre-
sentation as to one would not be ground for rescission as to the other. For a
statement of facts held sufficient to "complicate" separate contracts, see Casa-
major v. Strode (1834) 2 My. & K. 7o6, 725 and Dyke v. Blake (1837) 4 Bing.
N. C. 463, 477. Specific performance, however, is not a matter of strict right,
to be demanded on showing a valid legal contract, but will be refused where it
would be inequitable to grant it, because of the harshness of the bargain, or
the mistake of the defendant as to the terms or meaning of the contract and
equity will leave the parties to their remedies at law. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp.
see. 86o, Mortlock v. Buller, supra; Burkhalter v. Jones (x884) 32 Kan. 5, 3 Pac.
559, Kelly v. York Cliffs Co. (igoo) 94 Me. 374, 47 Adt. 898. Particularly is this
so if the mistake was occasioned even remotely by the claimant's acts or omis-
sions. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. sec. 860, Denny v. Hancock (i87o, C. A.) L. R.
6 Ch. i. No previous case seems to have called for the application of these
doctrines to the same situation as that presented in the principal case but the
decision, at least on- the question of specific performance, seems a logical exten-
sion of the principles established by the cases above cited. On the question of
rescission, some courts have gone a long way in granting relief even in the cases
of unilateral mistake, and it is submitted that if the purchaser, as a ground for
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rescission had relied on his mistaken belief that he was to get two lots to use
together, whereas he only obtained one, instead of attempting to "complicate"
the two contracts, so that the misrepresentation as to one would apply to both,
he would have stood on stronger ground. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp., sec. 852;
Brown v. Lamphear (1862) 35 Vt. 252; Ward v. Yorba (1899) 56 Pac. 58, 123
Cal. 447, but contra, Diman v. R. R. Co. (1858) 5 L I. 130; Moffett, etc. Co. v.
City of Rochester, supra.
L. F.
WI.Ls-AccmERATIoN OF REmAINDERS-ELEcTIoN OF WiDow GivEN Lim
ESTATE To TAKE AGAINST THE WiLy-rThe testator devised his residuary estate
in trust, part of the income to be used to provide an annuity for his sister-in-
law, and the remaining income and, upon the annuitant's death, all the income,
to be divided equally between his widow, son and daughter. At the widow's
death, the principal was to be divided equally between the son and the daughter,
the latter's share continuing in trust. The widow elected to take against the
will. Held, that the widow's election terminated the trust for'her life as though
she had died, and accelerated the son's interest so as to entitle hint, after a
sum sufficient to provide for the annuitant had been set aside; to receive imme-
diately one-half the residue. In re Disston's Estate (1917, Pa.) ioi At. ?04.
The general rule is said to be that election to take against the will effects the
same results as death. Beideman v. Sparks (19oo, Ch.) 6z N. J. Eq. 226, 47 Atl.
811. Baptist Female University v. Borden (19o3) 132 N. C. 476, 44 S. E. 47.
The instant case cites former Pennsylvania cases as establishing this rule. See
Ferguson's Estate (18go) 138 Pa. 208, 219, 2o Atl. 945, 946. Vance's Estate
(189i) 141 Pa. 201, 213, 21 Atl. 643, 645. But investigation of the authorities
shows that they proceeded on the ground that the only purpose of postponing
the remainders was to protect the widow's interest Election does not always
lead to acceleration. The superior rights of a disappointed devisee of property
passing to the widow by her election may prevent acceleration. Latta v. Brown
(1896) 96 Tenn. 343, 34 S. W. 417. And where the widow's death is the time
fixed for the payment of specific legacies, it has been held that no acceleration
takes place. Lovell v. Charlestown (i8gi) 66 N. H. 584, 32 Atl. i6o; Jones v.
Knappen (i89r) 63 Vt 391, 22 Atl. 63o. So, when the remainder is to a class
which will not be determined till the widow's death. Brandenburg v. Thorndike
(1885) 139 Mass. lO2, 28 N. E. 575. On principle it would seem that acceleration
should not be permitted when the rights of any other beneficiary will be preju-
diced. The court in the principal case assumes that the trust was only for the
widow's benefit and so puts the case within the general rule, without discussing
the rights of the annuitant It is submitted that nothing warranted such an
assumption and the decision seems inconsistent with an earlier Pennsylvania
case, cited by the court but not distinguished or overruled, where a similar trust
for the widow's life was continued for the protection of an annuitant Young's
Appeal (1884) io8 Pa. 17, 22. See also In re Wyllner's Estate (1917) 65 Pa.
Super. Ct 396,404.
G. L. K.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-WHoe. IS AN EMPLOYEE-PRESIDENT AND
MA.ORITY SToCKHOLDER OF CoaLoRATIoN.-The president of a corporation whose
salary was $7o per week and who, as majority stockholder, received annual
dividends of approximately $3oooo, lost his leg as a result of an injury sustained
while assisting in carrying lumber. Held, that he was not an employee within
the meaning of the Act Bowne v. S. W. Bowne Co. (1917) 221 N. Y. 28, 116
N. K. 364.
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The New York act, unlike the English act, does not expressly 
except from its
benefits workmen receiving more than a certain remuneration. 
Nor does its
language preclude a construction obliterating the distinction 
between the officers
of a corporation and its workmen. The New York Supreme 
Court has, there-
fore, declared that the fact that a claimant was vice president 
and a stockholder
of the employer in no way affects his status as an employee. 
Beckman v. Oelerich
(igi7, N. Y.) 174 App. Div. 353, i6o N. Y. Supp. 791. It has 
also sustained an
award to an officer and stockholder, when working as an 
ordinary workman.
Kennedy v. Kennedy Mfg. Co. (917, N. Y.) 177 App. Div. 56, 
x63 N. Y. Supp.
944. In the principal case, however, the first, apparently, 
to come before a
court of last resort, the court has denied the benefits of 
the act to the principal
executive officer, attaching considerable weight to the fact 
that, as stated by
the court, he was in reality the corporation, and its employee 
only by legal
fiction. The general ground of the opinion is that claimant 
was not the sort of
employee for whose benefit the legislation was enacted. 
Cf. New York C. R. R.
Co. v. White (igi6) 243 U. S. i88, 37 Sup. Ct 247. This conclusion 
seems amply
justified by the facts of the case, but since the claimant's 
official position, his
control over the corporation, his salary, and his "comfortable 
dividends" were
all relied upon, we are still left in doubt what the ruling would 
have been, had
any one of these elements been missing. H.S.
